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Intel Whistleblowers' Statements Sent for ATSDR Study |
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Written by Jeff Radford
Corrales Comment
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Saturday, 11 April 2009 |
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Final in a series
Letters from three Intel whistleblowers —one a former state air quality
regulator— on health effects of air pollution from the microchip
factories above Corrales are among public comments submitted to the
U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Control (ATSDR) on its
draft community health consultation.
Those and other materials are included in the lengthy submission by Rio
Rancho realtor Marcy Brandenburg, whose petition for Corrales Residents
for Clean Air and Water (CRCAW) tiggered the five-year ATSDR study
released in February.
The comment period closed April 3.
Contacted at agency headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, ATSDR’s team
leader for the study, Peter Kowalski, said April 2 he expects to be
able to incorporate the input and issue a final report by the end of
this year.
“It’s too early to tell how the draft might change because we’re still
receiving comments,” he said. “We’re anxious to keep this moving
forward, and appreciate all the information that has been provided by
the community.”
When the agency’s community health consultation for Intel-New Mexico
was issued in February, the report generally cited insufficient
information to determine whether Intel’s industrial chemical wastes
emitted to the air are causing health problems.
ATSDR recommended further air monitoring and other measures. (See
Corrales Comment’s previous four articles in this series starting in
Vol.XXVII, No. 24, February 7, 2009 “Federal Report on Intel Air
Pollution Finds Lack of Data.”)
Another substantive, technical submission to ATSDR commenting on its
draft report was provided by the Intel-funded Community Environmental
Working Group. Written by Los Alamos air pollution specialist Mike
Williams and adopted by consensus at the group’s March 18 meeting, the
three-and-a-half page comment praises the agency effort and
concurs that “We think its conclusions are well-founded.… We believe
that the conclusion that the available data is not adequate to
show conclusively that emissions are safe or that they are unsafe is
accurate.
“The logical response to this conclusion is to make the emissions safer
by reducing them and to gather appropriate data to make stronger
conclusions possible.”
Brandenburg’s submission for CRCAW, the citizens group formed in 1993
when Intel’s industrial fumes hung heavily in Corrales’ air, includes
verbatim letters from now-retired N.M. Air Quality Bureau air pollution
permit writer Jim Shively to N.M. Environment Department (NMED)
Secretary Ron Curry in January 2004 in which he explains why the
bureau’s permit for Intel is a “sham” that would not, and cannot,
protect people exposed to its pollution.
Another letter, from former Intel senior mechanical engineer Chris
Grotbeck who notes that he “designed, installed, operated and
maintained much of Intel’s air pollution control equipment” over more
than a decade, is based on his July 1, 2003 statement to NMED regarding
Intel’s cover-up of air pollution problems.
The Grotbeck letter, published in full below, says “A growing mountain
of evidence seems to suggest that the compounds emitted from the
scrubber stack are responsible for the numerous, often serious,
illnesses that have been reported in the neighboring community during
the last several years, notably by residents in the stack plume
dispersion field just downwind of the CUB (Central Utility Building)
scrubber.
“I was terminated from Intel less than a month after I had learned of
the CUB scrubber problem and questioned the politics surrounding its
treatment. I believe my termination was in retaliation for being vocal
about Intel’s policy of secrecy with regard to publicly-sensitive
issues, specifically with regard to the CUB scrubber, but as well for
challenging management on certain employment practices and on
expatriate tax and accounting structures that appeared to be unjust and
unlawful.”
Grotbeck was the second Intel whistleblower to come forward with
concerns about the factories’ pollution. George Evans, an industrial
hygienist with Intel nine years, believes he was forced to resign after
raising concerns internally about health problems for nearby Corrales
residents which might be caused by Intel’s emissions.
The letter in Brandenburg’s submission to ATSDR was written by Evans’
attorney. The letter explains “In the course of his duties, Mr. Evans
has become concerned about certain emissions originating from Intel’s
CUB scrubber and cooling towers, which apparently have been present for
several years.
“As you are probably aware, those release points are on a ridge
directly adjacent to and above the village of Corrales. Based on his
interviews with several engineers, Mr. Evans has become concerned that
the scrubbers and cooling towers may be emitting hydrochloric acid,
hydrofluoric acid, ammonium fluoride, ammonia salts, free ammonia and
chloramines in unknown quantities.”
The letter details what Evans tried to do to alleviate such problems
and how that resulted in internal retaliation and his conclusion that
Intel was trying to cover up the problem. He further believed that
Intel deliberately set out to mislead the community as to the safety of
its operations.
Brandenburg’s submission points out that “CRCAW is pleased is some of
the proposals and recommendations made by ATSDR to the N.M. Environment
Department and we are appreciative of the many efforts ATSDR made over
the past five years. It remains to be seen if NMED will do anything to
follow or heed ATSDR’s recommendations. In fact, on a more probable
than not basis, NMED will do ‘nothing’ as Secretary Ron Curry was so
aptly quoted as saying nearly five years ago in a public meeting and
with the full support of Governor Bill Richardson.”
The letter requested “a firm explanation as to why ATSDR is
unable to address [State air quality] permit issues when in all
fairness, the Intel-New Mexico permit continues to be and will remain
the source of all the dangers that exist around the Intel-New Mexico
microchip facility.
“ATSDR is a sister agency of the Centers for Disease Control, and CRCAW
holds that it is imperative ATSDR address the Intel-New Mexico permit.
If ATSDR is unable to do so, ATSDR must maintain all transparency as to
why their standard operating procedures preclude the assessment and
evaluation of the core issue of air pollution related illnesses… the
Intel permit.”
In a concluding paragraph, Brandenburg’s letter says “CRCAW asks ATSDR
to remain aware that on a more likely than not basis, Intel-New Mexico
not only poses a long-term risk to its nearby residents but Intel-New
Mexico poses a risk on a daily basis: the immediate risk of spiked
emissions that could potentially kill tens of thousands of residents.
“It is a well-known and never-argued fact that based on Intel-New
Mexico’s current permit Intel could kill tens of thousands of people
and still be within their permit levels. This has always been and
continues to be an outrage. To date, not a single Intel-New Mexico or
ATSDR employee has ever denied this potential outcome.”
Brandenburg recalled her conversations with ATSDR officials over the
past five years in which they apparently agreed that Intel’s air
pollution permit from the State of New Mexico was too permissive.
“Based on previous conversations with Mr. Kowalski and staff members,
and the implication there was something inherently wrong with the
Intel-New Mexico air permit, I anticipated that in the final ATSDR
report some recommendations would be made to the NMED about
re-assessing the current Intel-New Mexico permit. This was not to be.”
The attached letter that Air Quality Bureau permit write Jim Shively
wrote to NMED Secretary Ron Curry about the inadequacy of the permit
reads as follows.
“Secretary Curry:
“This letter is a follow-up to a meeting I had with [NMED Division
Director] Jim Norton and Jon Goldstein [public affairs] on October 24,
2003 regarding the Intel air quality permit and Air Quality Bureau
problems in general. This meeting was prompted by a reporter’s request
for an interview with me prior to my retirement on December 31,
2003. The reporter [Corrales Comment’s Jeff Radford] made the request
because I was a program manager of the New Source Review permitting
unit of the Air Quality Bureau from June 1994 until March 2001. The
reporter was denied the interview and I requested the meeting with Jim
Norton to at least inform him of how I expected the interview to
go.
“The Intel permit (No. 325M9) is a sham based on an EPA memo dated June
13, 1989, and the process that produced the permit was a farce. The
permit is impractical and unenforceable. This has been repeated and
emphasized many times and by many people during the review process and
since. It is written with the emission factors provided by Intel that
have never been independently validated. The department cannot
determine Intel’s air emissions nor can the factors or emissions be
determined with any real confidence or precision.
“Imagine trying to measure the diameter of a human hair with a
yardstick. Intel can’t be found in violation of the emission limits in
the permit. Only Intel knows the origin or validity of the factors.
“This permit, like many others, was granted due to pressure from the
permittee, but worse than that, by an inappropriate desire internally
to accommodate them to any extent possible. These actions reflect
poorly on the entire bureau, and as a result, it has become severely
compromised and lacks integrity and credibility….
“The department needs to rescind and reissue the permit and conduct the
review appropriately and in such a way that people know what is done,
how it’s done, and why it’s done.
“If you are interested in meeting to discuss specifics I’ll make myself
available. I have already provided Jim Norton with a list of 16 former
employees who have agreed to be contacted by the department. I think
you would appreciate their perspective.
Sincerely,
Jim Shively”
By way of introducing the Shively letter in her comments to ATSDR,
Brandenburg pointed out “Nowhere in the ATSDR report was there any
mention of the two Intel-New Mexico whistleblowers and NMED’s Jim
Shively’s letter about his concerns that the Intel permit is a
‘sham’ and will not protect the community. All of these gentlemen
provided information and even evidence that implicated Intel-New Mexico
and the NMED in an all-out game of secrecy and corruption in regard to
Intel-New Mexico air quality performance, their reporting process and
the entire permitting process.
“To my knowledge, ATSDR never contacted a single whistleblower or Mr.
Jim Shively who worked for the NMED for 30 years. ATSDR’s refusal to
contact these whistleblowers is nothing short of dereliction of their
duties to the Corrales, Rio Rancho and Albuquerque communities.”
The Grotbeck letter transmitted to ATSDR by Brandenburg reads as follows.
“To Whom it May Concern,
“I was a senior mechanical engineer with Intel for more than a decade.
I designed, installed, operated and maintained much of Intel’s air
pollution control equipment, among other building and site systems. The
following is an edited version of a statement I made on July 1, 2003,
to the New Mexico Environmental Division (NMED), pertaining to its
investigation of the Intel CUB scrubber pollution issue that is
currently underway in New Mexico. This statement may be republished,
as long as it is used or published in its entirety and not as excerpts
that could be misinterpreted or taken out-of-context.
“I became aware of a problem with the CUB (Central Utility Building)
scrubber in September, 2002, when a peer mechanical engineer in my
group, Jeff Kindley, presented a report to the engineers and managers
in the department outlining several solutions, their costs, and the
potential risks of not performing projects to correct the
problem. Those risks included health hazards and potentially poor
public relations with neighboring communities.
“Managers of the Intel New Mexico Site Materials and Services
department (the department responsible for operations and engineering
for all buildings, building systems, and site services, including all
of the pollution control systems) chose, at that time, not to perform a
project to improve or correct the problem.
“Rather, they chose to allow the CUB scrubber to continue running as it
had been. The choice was based on a limited budget and a need to
continue production. Some of the managers aware of the CUB scrubber
issue at that time were: Luis Kent Stam IV (mechanical engineering
supervisor), John Painter (site engineering manager), and Dennis Menta
(Site Materials and Services manager). It would have been normal
practice for those managers to present at least a summary of the report
to higher management.
“I would assume that, due to the sensitive nature of the problem in
this case, the report was immediately presented both to higher
management (probably at least to Gary Hensley, America’s region SMS
manager) and throughout the SMS, Public Relations, and Environmental
Health and Safety management groups at the New Mexico Site.
“It is now apparent that some of the managers (for example, EHS manager
Jim Casciano) knew of the problem shortly after it was first presented
then in September, 2002. I restated my position to Kent Stam in
October and I sent a letter referencing the CUB scrubber problem to
Stam, Painter, Menta, Hensley, and to Intel’s president and CEO, Craig
Barrett, in March, 2003. It is safe to say that the problem was well
known by the management at that time.
“George Evans, who was working as an industrial hygienist under Jim
Casciano, was made responsible for investigating and measuring the
stack emissions from the CUB scrubber in October, 2002. Evans outlined
a procedure for taking measurements that would determine not only the
chemical makeup of the emissions, but their origin.
“Evans was instructed by Jim Casciano to take the measurements in a way
that would not give an indication of the origin of pollutants. Such
measurements, of course, would not be able to definitively rule out
other sources of pollution. Mr. Evans objected to the imposed testing
procedure and subsequently quit his job because he believed Intel was
intentionally, and unethically, covering up the issue.
“[The] importance of the proposed projects was reiterated, again citing
potential health hazards and public relations risks associated with not
performing the projects. In that meeting, I questioned the management
decision not to perform the corrective projects, stating that if there
were health hazards and public concerns, the problem should be solved
before any other projects were considered to be funded —or that
the CUB processes and scrubber should be shut down until the projects
could be funded.
“The response I received to my statement in that meeting is best
described as ‘cold.’ No one said a word and the meeting attendees
looked at me as though to ask, “Just whose side are you on, anyway?”
“This response was representative of the general atmosphere at Intel
with regard to information secrecy related to public sentiment and
perception. Intel did many things to encourage its employees to promote
Intel’s image to the surrounding communities, including recruiting
employees who were residents of Corrales and Rio Rancho and training
them to be ‘ambassadors’ to their neighbors. Employees were encouraged
to say positive things about Intel’s financial commitment to the
community and Intel’s proactive environmental programs, but were
forbidden from saying certain negative things or from publicly
addressing ‘hot’ issues such as that of the CUB scrubber.
“Intel had several such programs for promoting its image to the public
and spent much energy, time, and money to sponsor newspapers and
community functions. However, amidst all the positive publicity, not a
word was published of the CUB scrubber or of any other problems that
could have affected the community. Nor was anything done to correct the
CUB scrubber problem. Still today, more than a year after the
problem was first discovered, the CUB scrubber continues to operate and
to jettison toxic compounds into the air.
“A growing mountain of evidence seems to suggest that the compounds
emitted from the scrubber stacks are responsible for the numerous,
often serious, illnesses that have been reported in the neighboring
community during the last several years, notably by residents in the
stack plume dispersion field just downwind of the CUB scrubber.
“I was terminated from Intel less than a month after I had learned of
the CUB scrubber problem and questioned the politics surrounding its
treatment. I believe my termination was in retaliation for being vocal
about Intel’s policy of secrecy with regard to publicly-sensitive
issues —specifically with regard to the CUB scrubber, but as well for
challenging management on certain employment practices and on
expatriate tax and accounting structures that appeared to be unjust and
unlawful.
“Intel, like many such powerful corporations, expends a great deal of
time, money, and energy attempting to diffuse and dilute issues of
liability. Many strategies for doing so straddle the boundary of
covertness, legality, and ethics. In the wake of financial collapse of
Enron and Worldcom, and of numerous corporate environmental disasters,
these policies must be publicly examined and changed.
Christopher Lee Grotbeck, P.E.
December 26, 2003
Bocas del Toro, Panamá”
The lengthy letter regarding Evans’ experiences at Intel by his attorney offers more detail on matters referred to by Grotbeck.
Regarding his concern that the CUB scrubber and cooling towers were
releasing chemicals —hydrochloric acid, hydrofluoric acid, ammonium
fluoride, ammonia salts, free ammonia and chloramines— that might
affect the health of nearby residents, the letter notes that “These
chemicals are respiratory irritants even at very low levels for those
with prior medical conditions. But Intel seems to have deliberately
chosen not to look into the conditions of the CUB scrubber, or do
sampling to evaluate its impact on the health of Corrales residents. It
is they who would be on the receiving of the plume from the CUB
scrubber stack and cooling towers on days when winds were pulled in
their direction and when inversions occurred —events which are fairly
common during early morning and at night.
“Furthermore, the scrubber has undeniably been in need of repair or
replacement for some time, as the throw-velocity and design of the
exhaust is sub-standard. The technicians working on the unit avoid the
scrubber because they know that the emissions are harmful. Apparently
these problems with the scrubber have been on the table for at least
five years. An odor probably attributable to the scrubber can be
detected walking at Intel’s border and in the Corrales neighborhood
nearby.”
The letter explains that when Evans balked at conducting air monitoring
and sampling he felt would cover up the problems at the CUB scrubber
and cooling tower, he felt he was being ostracized.
“Indeed, when Evans attempted to do sampling on two ‘no to low wind’
days, thinking that data set would be more indicative of the actual
plume (given that the plume for part of the day would [be] coming
straight down, the department manager became extremely angry and
ordered a complete stop of the sampling for a period of a week.”
The submission to ATSDR by Los Alamos air pollution computer modeler
Mike Williams for Intel’s Community Environmental Working Group last
month observes “We were a little disappointed that more use of modeling
results was not made” in evaluating possible health effects from
Intel’s releases. “It has been our experience that the best
understanding of air quality issues is made when emissions (estimated
or measured), models and measurements are considered together.”
Williams also zeroed in on ATSDR’s “misleading” assessment of the risk
from Intel’s release of silica. “We believe that the discussion of the
formation of crystalline silica is a little misleading. The literature
does note that crystalline silica forms above 800 degrees Celsius, but
the literature also suggests crystalline silica begins to form at lower
temperatures (750 degrees), which corresponds closely to the
recuperative thermal oxidizer [RTO] operating temperature of 1365
degrees Fahrenheit, so that some formation might be expected at
temperatures near those in the Intel facility. It is also important to
note that even a very small conversion on the order of 1 percent would
be sufficient to produce more of a hazard associated with crystalline
silica than associated with amorphous silica.”
Regarding possible exposure to the chemical phosgene, Williams
requested information from ATSDR whether the lethal gas has been
measured at other Intel facilities or other microchip factories. |
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